Titelaufnahme

Titel
Actors in the child development process / Daniela Del Boca (University of Torino, Collegio Carlo Alberto and IZA), Christopher Flinn (NYU and Collegio Carlo Alberto), Ewout Verriest (NYU), Matthew Wiswall (University of Wisconsin-Madison and NBER) ; IZA Institute of Labor Economics
VerfasserDel Boca, Daniela In der Gemeinsamen Normdatei der DNB nachschlagen ; Flinn, Christopher J. In der Gemeinsamen Normdatei der DNB nachschlagen ; Verriest, Ewout In der Gemeinsamen Normdatei der DNB nachschlagen ; Wiswall, Matthew In der Gemeinsamen Normdatei der DNB nachschlagen
KörperschaftForschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit In der Gemeinsamen Normdatei der DNB nachschlagen
ErschienenBonn, Germany : IZA Institute of Labor Economics, January 2019
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Elektronische Ressource
Umfang1 Online-Ressource (105 Seiten) : Diagramme
SerieDiscussion paper ; no. 12103
URNurn:nbn:de:hbz:5:2-179719 Persistent Identifier (URN)
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 Das Dokument ist frei verfügbar.
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Actors in the child development process [1.93 mb]
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Zusammenfassung (Englisch)

We construct and estimate a model of child development in which both the parents and children make investments in the child's skill development. In each period of the development process, partially altruistic parents act as the Stackelberg leader and the child the follower when setting her own study time. We then extend this non-cooperative form of interaction by allowing parents to offer incentives to the child to increase her study time, at some monitoring cost. We show that this incentive scheme, a kind of internal conditional cash transfer, produces efficient outcomes and, in general, increases the child's cognitive ability. In addition to heterogeneity in resources (wage offers and non-labor income), the model allows for heterogeneity in preferences both for parents and children, and in monitoring costs. Like their parents, children are forward looking, but we allow children and parents to have different preferences and for children to have age-varying discount rates, becoming more "patient" as they age. Using detailed time diary information on the allocation of parent and child time linked to measures of child cognitive ability, we estimate several versions of the model. Using model estimates, we explore the impact of various government income transfer policies on child development. As in Del Boca et al. (2016), we find that the most effective set of policies are (external) conditional cash transfers, in which the household receives an income transfer given that the childs cognitive ability exceeds a prespecified threshold. We find that the possibility of households using internal cash transfers greatly increases the cost effectiveness of external cash transfer policies.