Titelaufnahme

Titel
Adverse selection in low-income health insurance markets: evidence from a RCT in Pakistan / Torben Fischer (University of Mannheim), Markus Frölich (C4ED, University of Mannheim and IZA), Andreas Landmann (Paris School of Economics, J-PAL and C4ED) ; IZA Institute of Labor Economics
VerfasserFischer, Torben In der Gemeinsamen Normdatei der DNB nachschlagen ; Frölich, Markus In der Gemeinsamen Normdatei der DNB nachschlagen ; Landmann, Andreas In der Gemeinsamen Normdatei der DNB nachschlagen
KörperschaftForschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit In der Gemeinsamen Normdatei der DNB nachschlagen
ErschienenBonn, Germany : IZA Institute of Labor Economics, August 2018
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Elektronische Ressource
Umfang1 Online-Ressource (53 Seiten) : Diagramme
SerieDiscussion paper ; no. 11751
URNurn:nbn:de:hbz:5:2-164289 Persistent Identifier (URN)
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Adverse selection in low-income health insurance markets: evidence from a RCT in Pakistan [1.16 mb]
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Zusammenfassung (Englisch)

We present robust evidence on the presence of adverse selection in hospitalization insurance for low-income households. A large randomized control trial from Pakistan allows us to separate adverse selection from moral hazard, to estimate how selection changes at different points of the demand curve and to test simple measures against adverse selection. The results reveal substantial selection in individual policies, leading to welfare losses and the threat of a market breakdown. Bundling insurance policies at the household or higher levels almost eliminates adverse selection, thus mitigating its welfare consequences and creating the possibility for sustainable insurance supply.