Titelaufnahme

Titel
Uncertain altruism and non-linear long-term care policies / Chiara Canta (Toulouse Business School), Helmuth Cremer (University of Toulouse Capitole and IZA) ; IZA Institute of Labor Economics
VerfasserCanta, Chiara ; Cremer, Helmuth
KörperschaftForschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit
ErschienenBonn, Germany : IZA Institute of Labor Economics, June 2018
Ausgabe
Elektronische Ressource
Umfang1 Online-Ressource (28 Seiten) : Diagramme
SerieDiscussion paper ; no. 11619
URNurn:nbn:de:hbz:5:2-161301 
Zugriffsbeschränkung
 Das Dokument ist öffentlich zugänglich im Rahmen des deutschen Urheberrechts.
Volltexte
Uncertain altruism and non-linear long-term care policies [0.41 mb]
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Zusammenfassung

We study the design of public long-term care (LTC) insurance when the altruism of informal caregivers is uncertain. We consider non-linear policies where the LTC benefit depends on the level of informal care, which is assumed to be observable while childrens altruism is not. The traditional topping up and opting out policies are special cases of ours. Both total and informal care should increase with the children's level of altruism. This obtains under full and asymmetric information. Social LTC, on the other hand, may be non-monotonic. Under asymmetric information, social LTC is lower than its full information level for the lowest level of altruism, while it is distorted upward for the higher level of altruism. This is explained by the need to provide incentives to high-altruism children. The implementing contract is always such that social care increases with formal care.