Titelaufnahme

Titel
Salience of law enforcement : a field experiment / Robert Dur (Erasmus University Rotterdam, Tinbergen Institute, CESifo and IZA), Ben Vollaard (Tilburg University and CentER) ; IZA Institute of Labor Economics
VerfasserDur, Robert A. J. In der Gemeinsamen Normdatei der DNB nachschlagen ; Vollaard, Ben A. In der Gemeinsamen Normdatei der DNB nachschlagen
KörperschaftForschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit In der Gemeinsamen Normdatei der DNB nachschlagen
ErschienenBonn, Germany : IZA Institute of Labor Economics, June 2018
Ausgabe
Elektronische Ressource
Umfang1 Online-Ressource (28 Seiten) : Illustrationen, Diagramme, Karten
SerieDiscussion paper ; no. 11644
URNurn:nbn:de:hbz:5:2-161056 Persistent Identifier (URN)
Zugriffsbeschränkung
 Das Dokument ist frei verfügbar.
Volltexte
Salience of law enforcement [1.04 mb]
Links
Nachweis
Verfügbarkeit In meiner Bibliothek
Zusammenfassung

We conduct a field experiment to examine whether the deterrent effect of law enforcement depends on the salience of law enforcement activity. Our focus is on illegal disposal of household garbage in residential areas. At a random subset of 56 locations in a mid-sized city, law enforcement officers supplemented their regular enforcement activities by the practice of putting brightly-colored warning labels on illegally disposed garbage bags. This treatment made the existing enforcement activities suddenly much more apparent to residents. We find evidence for a substantial reduction in illegal disposal of garbage in response to the treatment.