Household savings and marriage payments : evidence from dowry in India / S Anukriti (Boston College and IZA), Sungoh Kwon (University of Connecticut), Nishith Prakash (University of Connecticut, IZA, HiCN, and CReAM) ; IZA Institute of Labor Economics
VerfasserAnukriti, S ; Kwon, Sungoh ; Prakash, Nishith
KörperschaftForschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit
ErschienenBonn, Germany : IZA Institute of Labor Economics, April 2018
Elektronische Ressource
Umfang1 Online-Ressource (69 Seiten) : Diagramme
SerieDiscussion paper ; no. 11464
 Das Dokument ist öffentlich zugänglich im Rahmen des deutschen Urheberrechts.
Household savings and marriage payments [1.71 mb]
Verfügbarkeit In meiner Bibliothek

This paper examines how traditional marriage market institutions affect households' financial decisions. We study how bride-to-groom marriage payments, i.e., dowries, influence saving behavior in rural India. Exploiting variation in firstborn gender and heterogeneity in dowry amounts across marriage markets, we find that the prospect of paying higher dowry increases household savings, which are primarily financed through increased paternal labor supply. This is the first paper that highlights this alternative motive for savings in dowry-paying societies. However, we find no impacts of dowry expectations on son-preferring fertility behaviors and investments in girls.