Titelaufnahme

Titel
Intentions for doing good matter for doing well: the (negative) signaling value of prosocial incentives / Lea Cassar (University of Cologne), Stephan Meier (Columbia University, IZA and NBER) ; IZA Institute of Labor Economics
VerfasserCassar, Lea In der Gemeinsamen Normdatei der DNB nachschlagen ; Meier, Stephan In der Gemeinsamen Normdatei der DNB nachschlagen
KörperschaftForschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit In der Gemeinsamen Normdatei der DNB nachschlagen
ErschienenBonn, Germany : IZA Institute of Labor Economics, December 2017
Ausgabe
Elektronische Ressource
Umfang1 Online-Ressource (58 Seiten) : Illustrationen, Diagramme
SerieDiscussion paper ; no. 11203
URNurn:nbn:de:hbz:5:2-145861 Persistent Identifier (URN)
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 Das Dokument ist frei verfügbar.
Volltexte
Intentions for doing good matter for doing well: the (negative) signaling value of prosocial incentives [0.71 mb]
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Zusammenfassung

Prosocial incentives and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) initiatives are seen by many firms as an effective way to motivate workers. Recent empirical results seem to support the expectation that prosocial incentive, e.g. in the form of a charitable donations by the firm, can increase effort and motivation - sometimes even better than monetary incentives. We argue that the benefits crucially depend on the perceived intention of the firm. Workers use prosocial incentives as a signal about the firm's type and if used instrumentally in order to profit the firm, they can backfire. We show in an experiment in collaboration with an Italian firm, that monetary and prosocial incentives work very differently. While monetary incentives used instrumentally increase effort, instrumental charitable incentives backfire compared to non-instrumental incentives. This is especially true for non-prosociallymotivated workers who do not care about the prosocial cause but use prosocial incentives only as a signal about the firm. The results contribute to the understanding of the limits of prosocial incentives by focusing on their signaling value to the agent about the principal's type.