Taxation, social protection, and governance decentralization / Gil S. Epstein (Bar Ilan University, IZA and CReAM), Ira N. Gang (Rutgers University, RWI, IOS, IZA and CReAM) ; IZA Institute of Labor Economics
Weitere Titel
The case for NIT and FT in Europe
VerfasserEpstein, Gil S. ; Gang, Ira N.
KörperschaftForschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit
ErschienenBonn, Germany : IZA Institute of Labor Economics, November 2017
Elektronische Ressource
Umfang1 Online-Ressource (23 Seiten) : Diagramme
SerieDiscussion paper ; no. 11148
 Das Dokument ist öffentlich zugänglich im Rahmen des deutschen Urheberrechts.
Taxation, social protection, and governance decentralization [0.33 mb]
Verfügbarkeit In meiner Bibliothek

Governments do not have perfect information regarding constituent priorities and needs. This lack of knowledge opens the door for groups to lobby in order to affect the government's taxation levels. We examine the political economy of decentralized revenueraising authority in light of social protection expenditures by constructing a theoretical model of hierarchical contests and comparing the implications of centralized with decentralized governance. Increasing information available to the government may generate additional expenditures by interest groups trying to affect government taxation decisions. We show the potential existence of a poverty trap as a result of decentralization in taxation decisions.