Titelaufnahme

Titel
The effect of ideological positions on job market interaction / Anat Alexandron-Lavon (Ruppin Academic Center), Gil S. Epstein (Bar-Ilan University, IZA and CReAM), Renana Lindner Pomerantz (Bar-Ilan University) ; IZA Institute of Labor Economics
VerfasserAlexandron-Lavon, Anat ; Epstein, Gil S. In der Gemeinsamen Normdatei der DNB nachschlagen ; Lindner Pomerantz, Renana In der Gemeinsamen Normdatei der DNB nachschlagen
KörperschaftForschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit In der Gemeinsamen Normdatei der DNB nachschlagen
ErschienenBonn, Germany : IZA Institute of Labor Economics, November 2017
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Elektronische Ressource
Umfang1 Online-Ressource (32 Seiten) : Diagramme
SerieDiscussion paper ; no. 11152
URNurn:nbn:de:hbz:5:2-142839 Persistent Identifier (URN)
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The effect of ideological positions on job market interaction [1.36 mb]
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Zusammenfassung

Reporters and editors may not have the same ideology. When an editor wants to employ a new reporter with a different ideology, they have to negotiate the price of moving from their own to the others ideology. We focus on the job market for reporters, where the agents negotiate over the ideological position to be reported and wage. We adopt a spatial model in which each agent suffers a utility loss as the agreed-upon position moves away from his/her favored one. Equilibrium determines a threshold ideological gap for a match to be formed. Our analysis generates a natural separation between extreme, mildly extreme and moderate ideologies. Furthermore, we find that agents that hold extreme ideologies compromise less than moderates. This formulation may be applied to other situations in which agents involve monetary and non-monetary considerations, especially a preference for similarity.