Titelaufnahme

Titel
Partners in crime: diffusion of responsibility in antisocial behaviors / Sascha Behnk (University of Zurich), Li Hao (University of Arkansas), Ernesto Reuben (New York University Abu Dhabi and IZA) ; IZA Institute of Labor Economics
VerfasserBehnk, Sascha In der Gemeinsamen Normdatei der DNB nachschlagen ; Hao, Li In der Gemeinsamen Normdatei der DNB nachschlagen ; Reuben, Ernesto In der Gemeinsamen Normdatei der DNB nachschlagen
KörperschaftForschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit In der Gemeinsamen Normdatei der DNB nachschlagen
ErschienenBonn, Germany : IZA Institute of Labor Economics, September 2017
Ausgabe
Elektronische Ressource
Umfang1 Online-Ressource (33, 34 Seiten) : Diagramme
SerieDiscussion paper ; no. 11031
URNurn:nbn:de:hbz:5:2-139512 Persistent Identifier (URN)
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Partners in crime: diffusion of responsibility in antisocial behaviors [4.59 mb]
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Zusammenfassung

Using a series of sender-receiver games, we find that two senders acting together are willing to behave more antisocially towards the receiver than single senders. This result is robust in two contexts: when antisocial messages are dishonest and when they are honest but unfavorable. Our results suggest that diffusion of responsibility is the primary reason for the increased antisocial behavior as our experimental design eliminates competing explanations. With a partner in crime, senders think that behaving antisocially is more acceptable and experience less guilt. Importantly, we identify a crucial condition for the increased antisocial behavior by groups: the partner in crime must actively participate in the decision-making. Our results have important implications for institutional design and promoting prosocial behaviors