Titelaufnahme

Titel
Performance and risk taking under threat of elimination / Nathan R. Adams (University of Oregon), Glen R. Waddell (University of Oregon and IZA) ; IZA Institute of Labor Economics
VerfasserAdams, Nathan In der Gemeinsamen Normdatei der DNB nachschlagen ; Waddell, Glen R. In der Gemeinsamen Normdatei der DNB nachschlagen
KörperschaftForschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit In der Gemeinsamen Normdatei der DNB nachschlagen
ErschienenBonn, Germany : IZA Institute of Labor Economics, August 2017
Ausgabe
Elektronische Ressource
Umfang1 Online-Ressource (40 Seiten) : Diagramme
SerieDiscussion paper ; no. 10977
URNurn:nbn:de:hbz:5:2-138548 Persistent Identifier (URN)
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Volltexte
Performance and risk taking under threat of elimination [0.57 mb]
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Zusammenfassung

We revisit the incentive effects of elimination tournaments with a fresh approach to identification, the results of which strongly support that performance improves under the threat of elimination and does so, but only in part, due to increases in risk taking. Where we can separately identify changes in risk-independent performance and risk taking, our estimates suggest that 23 percent of the improvement in performance induced by potential elimination is due to productive increases in risk taking. These effects are concentrated among those closest to the margin of elimination and among lower-ability competitors.