Social comparisons in oligopsony / Laszlo Goerke (IAAEU, Trier University, IZA and CESifo), Michael Neugart (Darmstadt University of Technology) ; IZA Institute of Labor Economics
VerfasserGoerke, Laszlo In der Gemeinsamen Normdatei der DNB nachschlagen ; Neugart, Michael In der Gemeinsamen Normdatei der DNB nachschlagen
KörperschaftForschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit In der Gemeinsamen Normdatei der DNB nachschlagen
ErschienenBonn, Germany : IZA Institute of Labor Economics, June 2017
Elektronische Ressource
Umfang1 Online-Ressource (36 Seiten) : Diagramme, Karten
SerieDiscussion paper ; no. 10820
URNurn:nbn:de:hbz:5:2-127017 Persistent Identifier (URN)
 Das Dokument ist frei verfügbar.
Social comparisons in oligopsony [0.38 mb]
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A large body of evidence suggests that social comparisons matter for workers valuation of the wage they receive. The consequences of social comparisons in imperfectly competitive labor markets are less well understood. We analyze an oligopsonistic model of the labor market where workers derive (dis-) utility from comparing their own wage with wages paid at other firms. As social comparisons become more prevalent all workers are paid higher wages, the wage distribution becomes more equal, and employment shifts to high productivity firms. Moreover, the total wage bill and output increase, while aggregate profits decline. Overall welfare rises. Our theoretical results have implications for estimating the elasticity of the labor supply curve facing a firm.