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Titel
Information, belief elicitation and threshold effects in the 5 X 1000 tax scheme : a framed field experiment / Leonardo Becchetti (University of Rome Tor Vergata and CESIS), Vittorio Pelligra (University of Cagliari and CRENoS), Tommaso Reggiani (LUMSA University Rome and IZA) ; IZA, Institute of Labor Economics
Weitere Titel
Information, belief elicitation and threshold effects in the five by thousand tax scheme
VerfasserBecchetti, Leonardo In der Gemeinsamen Normdatei der DNB nachschlagen In Wikipedia suchen nach Leonardo Becchetti ; Pelligra, Vittorio In der Gemeinsamen Normdatei der DNB nachschlagen In Wikipedia suchen nach Vittorio Pelligra ; Reggiani, Tommaso In der Gemeinsamen Normdatei der DNB nachschlagen In Wikipedia suchen nach Tommaso Reggiani
KörperschaftForschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit In der Gemeinsamen Normdatei der DNB nachschlagen In Wikipedia suchen nach Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit
ErschienenBonn, Germany : IZA Institute of Labor Economics, April 2017
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Elektronische Ressource
Umfang1 Online-Ressource (43 Seiten) : Diagramme
SerieDiscussion paper ; no. 10710
URNurn:nbn:de:hbz:5:2-121925 Persistent Identifier (URN)
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Information, belief elicitation and threshold effects in the 5 X 1000 tax scheme [0.25 mb]
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Zusammenfassung

In this paper we study by means of a framed field experiment on a representative sample of the population the effect on peoples charitable giving of three, substantial and procedural, elements: information provision, belief elicitation and threshold on distribution. We frame this investigation within the 5X1000 tax scheme, a mechanism through which Italian taxpayers may choose to give a small proportion (0.5%) of their income tax to a voluntary organization to fund its activities. We find two main results: a social information effect, since information on total donations received by the organizations in the previous year significantly increases the share of donors, and a distributional effect, leading, the information provision, to a significant increase in the share of donors to the organization reporting the lowest aggregate donations.