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Titel
Learning about the enforcement of conditional welfare programs : evidence from Brazil / Fernanda Brollo (University of Warwick, CAGE and CEPR), Katja Maria Kaufmann (Mannheim University, CESifo and IZA), Eliana La Ferrara (Bocconi University, IGIER and LEAP) ; IZA, Institute of Labor Economics
VerfasserBrollo, Fernanda In der Gemeinsamen Normdatei der DNB nachschlagen In Wikipedia suchen nach Fernanda Brollo ; Kaufmann, Katja In der Gemeinsamen Normdatei der DNB nachschlagen In Wikipedia suchen nach Katja Kaufmann ; La Ferrara, Eliana In der Gemeinsamen Normdatei der DNB nachschlagen In Wikipedia suchen nach Eliana La Ferrara
KörperschaftForschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit In der Gemeinsamen Normdatei der DNB nachschlagen In Wikipedia suchen nach Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit
ErschienenBonn, Germany : IZA Institute of Labor Economics, March 2017
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Elektronische Ressource
Umfang1 Online-Ressource (43, xiii Seiten) : Diagramme
SerieDiscussion paper ; no. 10654
URNurn:nbn:de:hbz:5:2-120862 Persistent Identifier (URN)
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Learning about the enforcement of conditional welfare programs [0.35 mb]
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Zusammenfassung

We study the implementation of Bolsa Familia, a program that conditions cash transfers to poor families on childrens school attendance. Using unique administrative data, we analyze how beneficiaries respond to the enforcement of conditionality. Making use of random variation in the day on which punishments are received, we find that school attendance increases after families are punished for past noncompliance. Families also respond to penalties experienced by peers: a childs attendance increases if her own classmates, but also her siblings classmates (in other grades or schools), experience enforcement. As the severity of penalties increases with repeated noncompliance, households response is larger when peers receive a penalty that the family has not (yet) received. We thus find evidence of spillover effects and learning about enforcement.