Titelaufnahme

Titel
Equality of opportunity, moral hazard and the timing of luck / Arnaud Lefranc (University of Cergy-Pontoise, THEMA and IZA), Alain Trannoy (Aix-Marseille University, CNRS and EHESS) ; IZA, Institute of Labor Economics
VerfasserLefranc, Arnaud In der Gemeinsamen Normdatei der DNB nachschlagen In Wikipedia suchen nach Arnaud Lefranc ; Trannoy, Alain In der Gemeinsamen Normdatei der DNB nachschlagen In Wikipedia suchen nach Alain Trannoy
KörperschaftForschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit In der Gemeinsamen Normdatei der DNB nachschlagen In Wikipedia suchen nach Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit
ErschienenBonn, Germany : IZA Institute of Labor Economics, March 2017
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Elektronische Ressource
Umfang1 Online-Ressource (36 Seiten) : Diagramme
SerieDiscussion paper ; no. 10645
URNurn:nbn:de:hbz:5:2-118919 Persistent Identifier (URN)
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Equality of opportunity, moral hazard and the timing of luck [0.47 mb]
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Zusammenfassung

Equality of opportunity is usually defined as a situation where the effect of circumstances on outcome is nullified (compensation principle) and effort is rewarded (reward principle). We propose a new version of the reward principle based on the idea that effort deserves reward for it is costly. We show that luck can be introduced in two ways in the definition of these principles, depending on whether the correlation between luck and circumstances should be nullified and whether the correlation between luck and effort should be rewarded. In this regard, the timing of luck with respect to effort decisions is crucial, as is exemplified by moral hazard where effort choice influences the lottery of future uncertain events.