Titelaufnahme

Titel
Performance pay and applicant screening / Uwe Jirjahn (University of Trier and IZA), Jens Mohrenweiser (Bournemouth University) ; IZA, Institute of Labor Economics
VerfasserJirjahn, Uwe In der Gemeinsamen Normdatei der DNB nachschlagen In Wikipedia suchen nach Uwe Jirjahn ; Mohrenweiser, Jens In der Gemeinsamen Normdatei der DNB nachschlagen In Wikipedia suchen nach Jens Mohrenweiser
KörperschaftForschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit In der Gemeinsamen Normdatei der DNB nachschlagen In Wikipedia suchen nach Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit
ErschienenBonn, Germany : IZA Institute of Labor Economics, March 2017
Ausgabe
Elektronische Ressource
Umfang1 Online-Ressource (59 Seiten)
SerieDiscussion paper ; no. 10643
URNurn:nbn:de:hbz:5:2-118899 Persistent Identifier (URN)
Zugriffsbeschränkung
 Das Dokument ist frei verfügbar.
Volltexte
Performance pay and applicant screening [0.83 mb]
Links
Nachweis
Verfügbarkeit In meiner Bibliothek
Zusammenfassung

Using German establishment data, we show thatthe relationship between intensity ofperformance pay and intensity of applicant screening depends on the nature of production. Inestablishments with increasedmultitasking,performance pay is positivelyassociated with applicant screening. By contrast, in establishments without increased multitasking, performance pay is negativelyassociated with applicant screening. The findings fit the hypothesis that performance pay induces a positive self-sorting of employees if jobs are less multifaceted. In this case, employers with a high intensity of performance pay do not need intensive applicant screening to ensure a high quality of matches between workers and jobs. However, if jobs are more multifaceted, performance pay can entail problems of adverse self-sorting. In order to mitigate or overcome these problems, employers making intensive use of performance pay also screen applicants more intensively.