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Titel
The effectiveness of incentive schemes in the presence of implicit effort costs / Sebastian J. Goerg (Florida State University and MPI for Research on Collective Goods), Sebastian Kube (University of Bonn and IZA), Jonas Radbruch (University of Bonn and IZA) ; IZA, Institute of Labor Economics
VerfasserGoerg, Sebastian J. In der Gemeinsamen Normdatei der DNB nachschlagen In Wikipedia suchen nach Sebastian J. Goerg ; Kube, Sebastian In der Gemeinsamen Normdatei der DNB nachschlagen In Wikipedia suchen nach Sebastian Kube ; Radbruch, Jonas In der Gemeinsamen Normdatei der DNB nachschlagen In Wikipedia suchen nach Jonas Radbruch
KörperschaftForschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit In der Gemeinsamen Normdatei der DNB nachschlagen In Wikipedia suchen nach Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit
ErschienenBonn, Germany : IZA Institute of Labor Economics, February 2017
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Umfang1 Online-Ressource (29 Seiten) : Diagramme
SerieDiscussion paper ; no. 10546
URNurn:nbn:de:hbz:5:2-112886 Persistent Identifier (URN)
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The effectiveness of incentive schemes in the presence of implicit effort costs [0.67 mb]
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Zusammenfassung

Agents decisions to exert effort depends on the provided incentives as well as the potential costs for doing so. So far most of the attention has been on the incentive side. However, our lab experiments underline that both the incentive and cost side can be used separately to shape work performance. In our experiment, subjects work on a real-effort task. Between treatments, we vary the incentive scheme used for compensating workers. Additionally, by varying the available outside options, we explore the role of implicit costs of effort in determining workers performance. We observe that incentive contracts and implicit costs interact in a non-trivial manner. Performance reacts significantly to changes in implicit effort costs under low-powered piece-rate and target-based bonus contracts, but not under a high piece rate contract. In addition, comparisons between the incentive schemes depend crucially on the implicit costs.